Take the discussion I just had on Twitter with @jeremiahg, @chriseng, @attritionorg, @dakami, @rybolov and others. I objected to the claim that everyone in the Fortune 500 is hacked, in the absence of two things:
- A clear definition of "hacked," and
- Some data supporting the assertion that everyone in the F500 fit that definition.
But is it the tip of the iceberg? Does having a bot automatically mean that more nefarious things are going on besides just selling V1agr4 or perhaps DDoSing the Anonymous target of the week? This is the risk calculation that we need more data to perform, and it's one that the C-suite would really appreciate.
So I'd love for someone to comb through their incident response data and present statistics on what, if anything, followed after an initial malware infection. If you could say that (for example) 70% of the time, it was simply used to grab CPU without necessarily trying to grab passwords or data, and 20% of the time it led to password compromise for financial theft, and 10% of the time it led directly to IP theft, those would let us infer probability. It would depict in a more concrete way just why being part of a botnet is a symptom of something more dangerous.
By association, any company that found itself with membership in a botnet could reasonably suspect that it was even more compromised than that. It might take the time to look further. (There are plenty of enterprises that just wipe the affected machine, re-image it, and go back to work.)
The other question is whether membership in a botnet should be considered public data. If anyone on the Internet can discover it, you could argue that it's the kind of compromise that anyone can report. The fact of an enterprise's system interacting with another host on the Internet isn't confidential; it (like a public posting) is just assumed to go unnoticed. Would a company have grounds to complain if its membership in a botnet were revealed, based entirely on publicly available information outside of its private network? I am not a lawyer, but sometimes I want to ask lawyerly questions like this.
Following this chain of thought, anyone could set up sensors, collect data on botnet membership, and publish it widely. Someone could collect statistics on just how many of a company's systems were in a botnet at any given time. In the absence of any other data, could this be used as a poor man's Compromise Index? It would be like someone noting how many broken windows you could see in a building: one indication of a breach, but without any way to know what, if anything, happened or was taken after the windows were broken.
And armed with that data, someone could actually make a substantiated claim that the whole Fortune 500 is hacked, without hearing the clackety-clack sound of thousands of eyes rolling.
After that comes the question, "So what?" Would this kind of naming and shaming prompt any additional diligence on the part of these organizations? Would it make regulators sit up and take notice? Call me a skeptic, but I suspect that botnet membership is so widespread that people would assume it happens to everybody -- just like ant invasions -- and it wouldn't be condemned except within the security echo chamber. I could be wrong. Either way, I'd love to find out.
[DISCLAIMER: I am not encouraging anyone to compromise any systems themselves without the permission of the affected organizations. I am not suggesting that anyone collect data that can only be gathered directly from those systems. I am certainly not recommending that anyone leak confidential data, even if it's with the best of intentions. Do not try this at home. Ask your parents before calling. And so on.]